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AFRICAN LAW AND BASIC INSTITUTIONS-A SEARCH
FOR PERSPECTIVE
William B. Harvey*
For a number of years I have studied with keen interest the development
of governmental institutions and law in the new African countries-particu-
larly in Ghana. In such study and writing, especially at this time, the effort
to maintain scholarly detachment and objectivity leaves an ache of incom-
pleteness. Scholarship has not in fact set the outer limits of my work in Africa.
In a very minor way, in a small but vital part of Africa, I have had the privi-
lege of being involved in the doing, the building of a new order. That involve-
ment rested on a conviction of the legitimacy of the African revolution and of
its long range contribution to human dignity and well being. Thus, I have
shared the buoyant optimism and the despair, the hopes and bitter disappoint-
ments, hopefully the insights and certainly some of the emotional prejudices
that characterize Africa today. Out of this wider experience this brief paper
has come.
The longer I have lived and worked in Africa the more hesitant I have
become to speak or write about Africa. Experience in West Africa, particularly
Ghana, provides some basis for assessment of developments there but certainly
not for continental generalizations. I suspect, however, that many of the
crucial factors that have influenced developments in Ghana, and the problems
that have arisen there, will be found in diverse forms in most of the new
nations south of the Sahara. This tentative judgment should not be equated
with knowledge however. Even within the narrow limits of Ghana, the awe-
some pace of change makes today's judgments suspect tomorrow. Neverthe-
less, in this essay I will use primarily the Ghanaian experience to suggest a
more general perspective of the evolution of law and government in the new
nations of Africa.
The indigenous societies of Ghana as well as the colonial regime left a
legacy that is largely dysfunctional to the development of a viable modern
state. The most significant aspect of that legacy is the essential localism of
traditional life and the resulting limitations of perspective and embryonic
loyalties. The nuclear social element was the family. On family units was
built a governmental order, extending through lineage and clan to an apex at
the level of the small Akan state, the Ewe division, or the independent town of
* Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law School. A.B., Wake Forest, 1943; J.D., Michigan,
1949.
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
the Ga-Adangbe people. Only in Ashanti was a wider organization ever stabi-
lized, and that almost exclusively for military purposes. Thus, the directing
loyalties were to small, local units, embracing the farms and villages within a
few miles of the capital town. People and places beyond were strange, to be
viewed with suspicion and often hostility.
Traditional Ghanaian attitudes toward agencies of government differed
from those supporting modern national governments. It was, in fact, difficult
to isolate such attitudes within the African's total world outlook, since the
power of civil government was merely one aspect of a total scheme that in-
cluded Divinity in its various manifestations, the forces of nature, the spirits of
departed ancestors, and the current members of the community. In the Akan
tradition, embracing the majority of the people of Ghana, the chief was both
civil ruler and priest, the intermediary between the living members of the
society and his own royal ancestors who were believed to watch over and
protect the people. Ritual functions were thus tightly interwoven with govern-
mental functions in the sacred person of the chief.
Despite his sacred status, however, the Akan chief did not possess absolute
powers. He was selected from among a number of eligibles provided by a royal
line through basically democratic consultative processes and was impressed
from the time of his election with the limitations on his power and his duties
to his people. Though perhaps inclined, in dealing with the delinquencies of
their chiefs, to a greater reliance than is suggested by modern 'governmental
theory and practice upon supernatural sanctions imposed by the gods and the
ancestors, the Akan did not lack more earthy techniques. When a chief per-
sisted in his wrongs despite the admonitions of the elders, he could incur the
ultimate sanction of loss of his office or destoolment. It appears, however, that
prior to the major impact of European power, destoolments were relatively
rare. Their increased frequency reflects changes in the institution of chief-
taincy introduced by the colonial power.
The indigenous chieftaincy with its numerous local variations and the
Weltanschauung that supported it did not, of course, provide the immediate
background for national government. Interposed between the two was an
extended period of colonial domination that often tended to distort the chiefly
institutions and to undermine their supporting attitudes. In Ghana, the pre-
vailing colonial theory was indirect rule, pioneered by Lugard among the
emirates of Northern Nigeria. Relatively small expatriate staffs were expected
to govern through the agencies of indigenous government which in turn were
regarded as integral parts of the scheme of administration. The positive aspect
of indirect rule was its aim to avoid serious social dislocation and to bring the
indigenous rulers to a higher level of insight and competence, but lack of under-
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standing of indigenous institutions frequently defeated these aims. Sometimes
as a result of actual misleading by the Africans themselves, the colonial govern-
ment attributed or allocated significant functions in ways and to persons lack-
ing traditional bases. Electoral processes were distorted in an effort to bring
to the stools persons loyal to the colonial administration. Inevitably, therefore,
the chiefs became increasingly identified with British power both in the valida-
tion of their authority and in the enlarged range of functions they undertook
to perform.
While the British colonial power undertook to preserve and to some extent
to adapt indigenous governmental institutions and the bodies of customary law
they administered, there was also a significant importation of law and govern-
mental models from the metropole. The usual pattern through British Africa
involved the reception of statutes of general application in force in England
on a specified cut-off date, the rules of common law and doctrines of equity,
and such imperial legislation as might be made applicable to the colony. In
addition, there was a body of local legislation brought into operation by the
edict of the royal governor or, after a local legislative body was created, by
enactment. Ordinarily this law derived from England was administered in
a system of superior courts staffed by expatriate judges. Custom supplied the
norms applicable to the great majority of the people. These norms were ap-
plied in inferior courts held in the exercise of chiefly authority, or later by the
authority of the metropolitan power, though still largely staffed by the chiefs
and their elders.
Ethnic criteria were the prime determinants of the applicable body of law.
Where the parties to a cause were Africans living according to the ordinary
manner of the African community, customary law was presumed to apply. It
was possible, however, to opt out of the regime of customary law and into
British law, the option being manifested expressly or by implication from the
circumstances. In most of British West Africa, a steadily growing body of
educated, Europeanized Africans came under the regulation of an imported
legal system, while the majority of the populace continued under regimes of
so-called "native law and custom." This dualism, involving elite and mass
population, received law and customary norms, European style courts and
traditional tribunals, modern secular government and the indigenous order
of priest-rulers, has posed some of the most perplexing problems of nation
building in the post-independence period.
The problems of ordering public power so as to respond effectively to the
problems of the new countries arise not only from such African circumstances.
A complex of world-wide influences also complicates the tasks. The indus-
trialized western democracies have attained standards of living, belatedly sup-
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ported by social welfare schemes, that stand in stark contrast to African priva-
tion. The Soviet Union by its own meteoric development and its demand for
social justice even at the expense of individual liberties offers a compelling
though sometimes transitory attraction. The conflict of the two great world
forces, now complicated by the advent of Communist China as a third sig-
nificant factor, inevitably has influenced both attitudes and events in Africa.
The obvious courting of the new African states, reflecting the general cold
war competition, has compounded the African fear of "neo-colonialism," of
having newly won political independence rendered illusory by pervasive eco-
nomic and cultural domination. Thus, the world outside Africa has offered
with dramatic suddenness a vision of life contrasting sharply with conditions
in Africa. At the same time that world stimulates deep-rooted fears of domina-
tion and exploitation that colonial experience does not assuage. The outside
world also offers competitive development models for African adoption.
Against this general background the basic problems of government and
law can be outlined only briefly but perhaps sufficiently to suggest their dimen-
sions. How can Africans themselves, with their limited resources in trained
manpower, organize public power so it can respond effectively to the aspirations
and demands of their people for accelerated economic and cultural develop-
ment? How can this demand for accelerated development, to make up for
decades and in some cases centuries of neglect and exploitation, be accom-
modated to the processes of deliberation and democratic control that underlay
much of the traditional mode of life? And how can the resources of the world
outside Africa be tapped without opening the door to a new bondage, less
obvious but no less real than that recently ended ?
The constitutional experience of Ghana since independence suggests a
pattern of response to these questions that in essentials has become common in
the new African countries. The pattern may be seen in terms of certain funda-
mental issues requiring resolution.
Unity or Communalism
The political units brought to independence in Africa have in general been
defined by the colonial boundaries. Thus neither ethnic nor functional ration-
ality has greately influenced the shape of the new nations. Ghana with a total
area about the size of Oregon and a population near 7 millions stretches from a
coastal plain along the Gulf of Guinea, through the high rain forests of
Ashanti, to the sub-Saharan savannahs of the North. Tribal, cultural, and
economic disparities are substantial. The colonial administration functioned
on the basis of four major territorial divisions which were merged in independ-
ent Ghana. Until virtually the eve of independence, however, the British
deferred steps that, at an earlier time, might have reduced the corroding hostili-
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ties and suspicions that often affected the small, local groups of the traditional
society and thus have fostered a fruitful sense of interdependence on which the
new nation could be built.
The nature of the constitutional order at independence became a major in-
ternal issue in the Gold Coast in 1954 with the organization in Ashanti of the
National Liberation Movement. The constitutional program of the N.L.M. was
federalism, its primary drive coming from the communal pride, economic self-
interest, and external suspicions of Ashanti. Ashanti cocoa, timber, and gold
represented most of the wealth of the embryonic country; why should this be
shared through a government alien to Ashanti? Ashanti warriors had for
centuries terrorized the southern people and until the end of the 19th century
kept the British at bay; what had they in common with the soft coastal people?
Chieftaincy in Ashanti was a sophisticated, entrenched institution; what
hazards for it lay in Dr. Nkrumah's Convention People's Party, whose center
of gravity lay in the masses of the coastal Colony?
Under Dr. Nkrumah, the policy of the C.P.P. has not wavered. He be-
lieves that if independent governments in Africa are to meet the challenges
before them, they must be unified and strong and in turn must explore every
possibility for wider areas of unity. It is unnecessary to trace in detail the
constitutional, legal, and political steps taken in pursuing this policy, by which
the unity of Ghana has been forged. In summary, it can be said that govern-
mental power has been centralized completely; whatever is done at local or
regional levels is by delegated and carefully limited powers. The chieftaincies
have been stripped of all independent economic power, largely by the nation-
alized administration of stool lands, and have been left with only ritual func-
tions. Government has thus been secularized and the traditional seats of local
separatism deprived of effective power. The result of the often harsh struggle
for effective nationhood is the entrenched affirmation of the Republican Consti-
tution of 1960 that Ghana is a "sovereign unitary Republic," and Ghana's
vigorous, frequently abrasive, championing of all measures to promote early
political unity on a continental basis.
Underlying this aspect of Ghana's development is Dr. Nkrumah's basic as-
sumption that Africa's only hope for rapid development in true independence
lies in the creation of strong organs of government embracing sufficient popu-
lation and resources to meet the challenges and demands of modern life. The
national states as defined by the European scramble for Africa and left as the
legacy of colonialism are, in his view, a continuing guarantee of African in-
stability, underdevelopment, and vulnerability to outside domination. One can
readily agree that no rational mind, unencumbered by colonial history, would
ever have devised the present division of Africa. Between that recognition and
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effective steps to submerge nascent African nationalism in a larger political
unity stands an immense barrier of local loyalties, the entrenched claims of
present national leaders to power and prestige, ideological differences, and eco-
nomic self-interest. Dr. Nkrumah's urgency in demanding continental political
unity has in fact proved dysfunctional to the more limited forms of multi-
national cooperation that might be feasible in Africa today.
In 1963, thirty-two independent African states formed the Organization of
African Unity. Despite its name, the Organization rests firmly on the recogni-
tion of present national units as the basic data of legal and political life in
Africa. Membership in the Organization involves no cession of national
sovereignty. Rather, it provides a forum within which the Heads of State can
discuss matters of common concern with a view to co-ordination and harmon-
ization of national policies. With the intra-Africa potential for disputes and
conflict in view, the Charter provides also for the creation of a Commission of
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. An ad hoc forerunner of this Com-
mission has already acted with apparent success to settle the border conflict
between Algeria and Morocco. Other specialized commissions are contem-
plated to facilitate cooperation in economic, educational, health, defense, and
scientific matters.
The birth of the Organization of African Unity has not rationalized the
juridical structure of political life in Africa. The conflicting views earlier or-
ganized in the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs, the expansionist ambitions of
some states, and the corroding fears and suspicions still haunt the councils
of O.A.U. Nevertheless, an important first step has been taken by the African
nations to create a framework for resolving their differences and extending
the areas of shared objectives and programs. The mere existence of such a
continental effort at this stage of African development is an achievement full
of hope for African stability and progress.
Absolute Government or Fundamental Rights
The drive for government stable and strong enough to mold the diverse
elements of the new African countries into functional entities has raised con-
stantly the question of the desirability of constitutional restraints on govern-
ment for the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual. The
emerging answers to this question have varied, even within former British
Africa. Ghana's experience suggests the dominant pattern, however.
The Independence Constitution of Ghana, promulgated in the form of
an imperial Order in Council, contained three substantive limitations on legis-
lative power. The first prohibited the making of any law imposing on persons
of any racial community disabilities to which persons of other such communi-
ties were not made liable. The safeguard did not foreclose any particular disa-
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bility but only required equality in the application of any disability imposed.
The second safeguard guaranteed freedom of conscience and the "right freely
to profess, practice or propagate any religion." This guarantee was subject
however to "such restrictions as may be imposed for the purposes of preserving
public order, morality or health." The third limitation guaranteed adequate
compensation, judicially determined, on the compulsory acquisition of property
for public purposes. These guarantees were in turn protected by a complex
set of provisions rendering the amendment of the Constitution quite difficult.
Although these limited constitutional guarantees were not themselves con-
troversial, they were caught up in the general process by which the Nkrumah
government sought to consolidate unified national power. In 1958, the Con-
stitution was amended to grant unlimited legislative powers to Parliament.
While the three guarantees were left intact, they became subject to modification
by a simple act of Parliament. In fact, however, they were not changed until
the Republican Constitution of 1960, which eliminated them entirely.
In the controversy over the Preventive Detention Act, perhaps the most
publicized piece of authoritarian legislation in independent Ghana, it was
argued by those attacking the act that article 13 of the Constitution had the
effect of a Bill of Rights. This article sets out the full text of a "solemn declara-
tion before the people" that the President is required to make immediately
after assuming office. Among the fundamental principles to which the Presi-
dent must declare his adherence are these:
That no person should suffer discrimination on grounds of sex, race, tribe, religion or
political belief....
That subject to such restrictions as may be necessary for procuring public order, mor-
ality or health, no person should be deprived of freedom of religion or speech, of the
right to move and assemble without hindrance or the right of access to courts of law.
That no person should be deprived of his property save where the public interest so
requires and the law so provides.
In its decision, upholding the validity of the Preventive Detention Act, the
Supreme Court of Ghana held that this declaration by the President does not
constitute a juridical Bill of Rights. Rather, it is a ceremonial and political
declaration of principles, somewhat like a Coronation Oath. This conclusion
finds support in the history of article 13, as well as in the fact the principles like
those quoted above are coupled with others that obviously could not be more
than the postulation of political ideals, e.g., "that every citizen of Ghana should
receive his fair share of the produce yielded by the development of the country."
While the Constitution of Ghana therefore lacks a Bill of Rights in the
conventional form, it does seek to assure the most fundamental of the political
rights, that is, the right of the people to have their freely expressed will operate
as the fundamental source of governmental power. Thus article 1 declares
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that "the powers of the State derive from the people, by whom certain of those
powers are now conferred on the institutions established by this Constitution
and who shall have the right to exercise the remainder of those powers .... "
The exercise of the power of the people is made subject to the principle that
"without distinction of sex, race, religion or political belief, every person, who,
being by law a citizen of Ghana, has attained the age of twenty-one years and
is not disqualified by law on grounds of absence, infirmity of mind or crimi-
nality, shall be entitled to one vote, to be cast in freedom and secrecy."
As British experience indicates clearly, the full implementation of this basic
political right in a society that values liberty and reacts strongly against its
arbitrary restraint would leave little, if any, need for a detailed Bill of Rights
limiting legislative and executive power. In Ghana the formal machinery of
democratic elections was until recently intact. In actuality, however, demo-
cratic political choice has often been distorted by a poorly informed electorate,
by intimidation at political rallies and even of voters at the polls, and by the
multiform pressures and inducements that a monopolistic political party, aided
by all of the resources of government, can bring to bear. This should not be
read as a unilateral indictment of the Convention People's Party or the
Nkrumah government. In fact, electoral abuses have been committed by both
the government party and its opposition. It is doubtless impossible at this time
fairly to assign initial responsibility or blame between the political groups.
Despite the abuses of the electoral processes, however, it is probable that Dr.
Nkrumah and his government until fairly recently have enjoyed popular sup-
port in approximately the measure shown in election results.
Protection of the basic right to political participation was seriously curtailed
in early 1964 by an amendment to the Republican Constitution making Ghana
de jure as well as de facto a one-party state. The franchise broadly granted on a
non-discriminatory basis and the machinery of elections may become meaning-
less if restrictions on political organization and achieving a place on the ballot
foreclose actual choice. In theory, the interplay of viewpoint and the validation
of power by the consent of the governed could occur within the structure and
processes of a single party. There is no available experience to indicate that this
potential of the one-party system has been realized, however.
The competitive pattern among the new African states is illustrated by
the Federation of Nigeria, whose lengthy constitution contains a full Bill of
Rights. A complete assessment of the effect of such a device cannot be at-
tempted here. It should be observed, however, that the Nigerian guarantees
usually provide some leeway for restraints which are "reasonably justifiable
in the interests of public security, public health or morals" or which are "reason-
ably justifiable in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
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public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." It
seems to me a substantially unproved proposition that such a Bill of Rights
would have foreclosed the stringent governmental measures which have been
invoked in Ghana. In the final analysis the question is one of circumstances
and response. As political tensions have increased in the Nigerian Federation,
discussion has turned there, as in Ghana, to a strong governmental response,
including, for example, preventive detention. Whether the protection of in-
dividual freedoms in the context of a democracy, which has thus far char-
acterized Nigeria, will continue is by no means certain. A period of severe
testing is approaching as the country moves toward a national election in late
1964.
Experience in many countries strongly suggests that effective protection of
individual rights requires an independent judiciary to which the citizen has
ready access and a professional bar both legally and factually free to accept cases
in which individuals seek professional help. Whether such institutions, insofar
as they have existed in Africa, can survive the present tide of authoritarianism
is in grave doubt. Dr. Nkrumah's dismissal of the Chief Justice of Ghana after
politically unacceptable but legally justified acquittals in a treason prosecution
and the subsequent amendment of the Constitution so as to make the tenure
of judges subject to the uncontrolled discretion of the President have gravely
undermined public confidence in the independence and integrity of the higher
courts. With the judiciary so compromised and with defendants in politically
sensitive cases experiencing great difficulty in securing the assistance of counsel,
it is doubtful that any formal constitutional guarantees could effectively pro-
tect the individual from official oppression.
Recent developments in Ghana have undermined an established tradition
of judicial independence. In some of the new African countries no such tradi-
tion has ever existed, and the immediate future does not seem propitious for
its development. In a few areas, of which Nigeria is the outstanding example,
courts and lawyers still provide limited but extremely important safeguards
of a fair hearing under the law of the land in reviewing and to some extent
controlling the impingements of official force on the individual.
Political Monopoly or Political Diversity
Sir Ivor Jennings has suggested that a society's devotion to the Rule of Law
may be assessed by an examination of the status of that group corresponding to
Her Majesty's loyal opposition. Such a test would produce bleak results among
the new African nations. In fact, the pervasive difficulties that have arisen in
developing a "loyal opposition" raise the fundamental question whether such
democratic governmental institutions are able to respond to African needs or
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able to survive in African conditions. Peregrine Worsthorne, an English
journalist, has suggested that absent certain attitudes and institutions which
provide its English underpinning, the formal faqade of parliamentary de-
mocracy on the Westminster model openly invites tyranny. His argument
merits careful consideration in the light of African conditions and experience.
Dr. Nkrumah introduced the mass political party to sub-Saharan Africa.
The Convention People's Party still provides a model of monolithic organiza-
tion under his charismatic leadership. Somewhat similar phenomena can be
found in Guinea under President Toure, in Western Nigeria under Chief
Awolowo before his imprisonment, in Eastern Nigeria under the earlier
Azikiwe, in Tanganyika under Dr. Nyerere, and perhaps in Kenya under
Jomo Kenyatta. Semi-feudal leadership with monopolistic tendencies has
achieved power in Liberia and Northern Nigeria. In the Congo leadership
status has appeared to be largely a function of tribalism; only Lumumba
seemed to have a conception of a truly national political movement not resting
primarily on tribal loyalties. Whether Moise Tshombe will in this respect be
the heir of Lumumba remains an open question. Opposition in the Congo has
thus far tended to be separatist and violent. If the national government is able
to stabilize its power, there is little reason to expect its leaders to be tolerant
of even peaceful political opposition.
Despite the hazards of generalization, one observation seems generally
valid-political opposition to the incumbent leadership is non-existent or in-
effectual virtually everywhere in independent Africa except at the federal
level in Nigeria. A 1962 survey by the International Commission of Jurists
is illuminating. No official opposition exists in eight countries-Dahomey,
Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Upper Volta. In
the Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Senegal, Tanganyika,
and Togoland, as well as the Regions of Nigeria, one party is completely
dominant. (The inclusion of the Nigerian Regions in this category might
now be questioned.) In Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, and South Africa, there is
also' a observable tendency toward a one party system. In some states the
leaders of former opposition groups have joined the dominant party; in a
number of other instances they are in prison or in exile. As noted earlier,
Ghana formalized its status as a one-party state by a constitutional amend-
ment in early 1954.
How can one explain this development? Certain causal factors which
have appeared clearly in Ghana may suggest answers.
1.. Concentration on primary goals. In the twilight of a colonial experience
there is an understandable tendency for certain primary goals to dominate
political life-political independence, stability, rapid economic development,
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avoidance of entanglement in major bloc conflicts, freedom from the more
subtle "neo-colonial" domination. These objectives are hardly controvertible,
though significant shadings of emphasis and variation in approach may appear.
In Ghana, for example, the old United Gold Coast Convention plumped for
independence as soon as possible, but Nkrumah's C.P.P. carried the day with
its demand for independence now.
The tendency for mediate or instrumental values to define moderate but
effective lines of political controversy or competition is a function of more
mature, sophisticated experience. The political group in an African country
that manages the fundamental transition from colonial to independent status
can usually depend on an extended period of almost unquestionable dominance
while pursuing a set of generally accepted goals. Opposition to that group or
its policies can easily be transmuted into a timorous or positively subversive
adherence to the familiar and alien colonial or "neo-colonial" pattern.
2. The scarcity of political talent. Several of the new countries have dis-
covered a certain number of dynamic political leaders, tough, astute, and sensi-
tive to the aspirations of their people. The supply of such leadership is rela-
tively limited, however. A leadership group whose personal charisma has been
reinforced in the successful drive for independence is unlikely to be challenged
seriously for some time by leaders of the quality and stature of those outside
its ranks. Not only does the shortage of high level manpower serve to explain
one-party dominance, it provides as well the most plausible justification for
such a system. As many have pointed out, the loyal opposition must be a group
outside of and unassociated with the government party, who have the potential
through orderly elective processes to become an alternative government. Such
a system requires a reserve of able leaders freely devoted to criticism and op-
position outside the functioning organs of government. Few, if any, of the
new African states now have available human resources that would justify the
relegation to such non-operational roles of a substantial share of its best man-
power. Certainly Ghana does not. The demand is urgent and, I believe, justi-
fied, that non-fundamental differences be submerged and all talents and energies
devoted to the pressing tasks of national development.
3. The abandonment of constitutional processes of opposition. Those who
see the lack of organized opposition as evidence of suppression of democratic
processes in the new African countries often have a mental picture of the
"loyal opposition" familiar in western democracies. If, in fact, such opposition
is being eliminated in Africa, it is a cause for serious concern. In most places,
however, a serious doubt exists whether the suppressed opposition has by its
conduct made a valid claim to continued activity.
Ghana again is a useful case in point. The nationalist movement in the
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Gold Coast had traditionally been a middle class, intellectual movement, with
close though not always harmonious ties with the traditional authorities and
with a relatively paternalistic attitude toward the mass of people. Such a move-
ment was the United Gold Coast Convention whose leaders invited the young
Nkrumah to return from Britain in 1948 as Secretary of the Convention. Deep
cleavages in philosophy and method were soon evident between the young
agitator and his more conservative seniors. In 1949, Nkrumah left the Con-
vention and organized the Convention People's Party, the first mass political
movement in sub-Saharan Africa.
Following elections in 1950, under the new Coussey Constitution, a sub-
stantially responsible African government under Dr. Nkrumah was installed.
The U.G.C.C. and a number of successor and related organizations have re-
mained "the opposition," insofar as that term can be used. Their record of
constructive political activity in the past twelve years has been disappointing
indeed. In the constitutional deliberations prior to independence, Nkrumah
frequently invited consultation, but the invitations were declined. Sir Frederick
Bourne was invited to the Gold Coast as constitutional adviser in an effort to
reconcile the sharply conflicting views over regionalism. The opposition groups
refused to consult with him, however, and also declined to attend the con-
ference held at Achimota to discuss the Bourne report. On critical occasions
the opposition boycotted the Legislative Assembly debates. By 1958, political
non-cooperation had reached the point of refusal to contest elections. In the
important Regional Assembly elections of that year there was a total refusal
by the opposition groups to participate.
Whatever may have been the reasons for this recalcitrance of the opposition,
it has had a most unfortunate effect on political life in Ghana. The Govern-
ment has used it as evidence to support the contention that as early as 1954 the
opposition groups decided to abandon constitutional processes of opposition
and to attempt to acquire power by force. I do not find the evidence persuasive
to support such a broad conclusion. Two facts are quite clear however: the
opposition in Ghana has not played the traditional role of the loyal opposition,
and there have been, in fact, resorts to violence and apparent efforts to stage a
coup d'tat.
An attempt on Dr. Nkrumah's life at Kulungugu in August, 1962, another
in January, 1964, and continuing acts of terrorism fit into a pattern that has
become tragically common. The assassination of President Olympio in Togo,
an alleged attempt against President Tubman of Liberia, the disgusting murder
of Patrice Lumumba in Katanga with the* obvious complicity of his enemies
in Leopoldville, allegations of attempted coups in Senegal and Mali go far to
explain the widespread suspicion of political opposition and its frequent sup-
piession in the new African states.
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4. Lack of institutionalized opposition in the traditional order. Another
partial explanation of the current status of opposition forces in the new nations
may lie in the absence of any notion of institutionalized opposition within the
framework of indigenous government. It is clear no such institution was
known to the people of Ghana, even among the Akans who developed the most
complex governmental systems. The chief was a sacred figure; he represented
the gods and the ancestors, and neither his program, his responsibilities, nor
his loyalties were partisan in any common use of the term. In his administra-
tion he had the benefit of the counsel of his elders who in turn depended on
extensive patterns of consultation from the family level upward. The chief
who habitually failed in meeting his responsibilities could be destooled, but
neither this event nor the selection of a successor involved the use of a critical
opposition who stood ready to provide an alternative.
It is quite possible that deeply rooted attitudes drawn from the traditional
life in part explain the difficulties of the modern opposition political groups
and the tendency to equate institutionalized opposition with disloyalty. It
should be emphasized, however, that these indigenous attitudes did not stig-
matize dissent or the expression of conflicting views. When these appeared in
the traditional councils, it was expected that discussion would continue until
a consensus emerged. Similarly today the proponents of a one-party system
insist that such a framework can accommodate diversity and provide the
benefits usually claimed for inter-party competition and parliamentary debate.
This is doubtless true, if the leaders of the single party open basic issues to de-
bate and tolerate the expression of diverse views until a consensus develops.
There is little evidence that this has occurred in Ghana.
Prediction and Assessment
Some tentative conclusions may be drawn on the probable developments
of the next decade, though the longer range prospects are obscured. In areas
where government achieves a moderate degree of stability and effectiveness in
mobilizing social forces for the tasks of national development, it will be char-
acterized by a strong executive wielding on a broadly discretionary basis a wide
range of powers. In some instances, as in Ghana, the executive will draw sup-
port from a mass political party using modern propaganda techniques and pre-
serving its entrenched position by intimidation and manipulation of the per-
quisites that a national government can provide. Executive domination will be
buttressed by the personal charisma of leaders like Dr. Nkrumah in Ghana, the
religio-cultural leverage of others like the Sardauna of Sokoto in Northern
Nigeria, and the tribal roles of others like President Kasavubu of the Congo
Republic. Incumbent executives will tend to view with suspicion and hostility
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even embryonic opposition forces and to employ a variety of legal and extra-
legal methods to neutralize them.
Legislative bodies will rarely, I believe, represent significant power centers
checking the initiatives of the executive establishments. In many instances this
weakness will result from the single party political structure that identifies the
overwhelming majority with a strong leader of the executive branch. A num-
ber of other factors such as limited educated manpower, dispersal of influence
among tribal and other subnational groups, will also tend to diminish legisla-
tive effectiveness.
The courts will, in my judgment, rarely play a strongly creative role'in the
development or adaptation of the law or serve as a significant restraint on the
political branches of government. Neither the English nor the French judicial
tradition transmitted to Africa makes such roles natural or familiar to the
judiciary. The absence of a juridical Bill of Rights in most of the new con-
stitutions.substantially forecloses resort to the courts by individuals who feel
their fundamental rights are in jeopardy. Even where constitutional guarantees
of individual rights have been articulated, as in Nigeria, there is sufficient
maneuvering room for African judges, who cannot be insensitive to the pres-
sures and tensions of the new national societies, to enable them to sustain
stringent applications of governmental power. There is an increasing risk, as
well, of the complete subordination of the courts to the political branches of
the government and to unofficial political pressures.
If these forecasts are substantially accurate, one immersed in the politico-
legal traditions of the western democracies may be inclined to view the future
of law and government in Africa with pessimism. There are, however, certain
long range factors that justify a more hopeful view of the development of law
and government in Africa.
The dominant ideologies behind the current ferment in Africa are in gen-
eral humane. The human being, his needs, demands, and aspirations are the
central data. The stereotype of the happy savage, content in a simple agricul-
tural or pastoral life, undemanding of the material and cultural advantages
desired by the European, and accepting of the latter's natural domination,
certainly does not reflect the African of today, if it ever had validity. The
African has grown increasingly conscious of a broader world and of the goods
it offers that have been denied him. He, therefore, wants education, if not for
himself then certainly for his children. He wants a greater freedom from
endemic diseases. He also want a far greater share of the material benefits of
his land and his labor than the colonial order assigned to him. And finally,
but perhaps most fundamentally of all, he wants to take his place as an ac-
cepted equal in a World society of free men.
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This pattern of needs and expectations underlies the revolutionary develop-
ments in Africa since the Second World War. It is these demands that African
political leaders and governments, in a variety of ways, with varying degrees
of patience and differing concessions to human greed and personal ambition,
have been pressing. If the idea of natural law has any rational meaning what-
soever, that meaning derives from the quasi-empirical perception that demands
such as these are felt by all men and from the moral conviction that they
should, insofar as possible, be satisfied.
In pursuing their goal of rapid development, African leaders have given
varying degrees of consideration to the left-authoritarian models of the Eastern
bloc. The competition of the cold war assures such consideration, whatever
intrinsic attraction the models might have. As a consequence, the African
countries are often categorized by reference to their degree of commitment to
the West or the warmth of their flirtation with the East. Some political figures
in this country, possibly out of malice but more probably ignorance, have used
the epithet "Soviet satellite" in referring to Ghana. Aside from trade, aid, and
cultural relations with Communist bloc countries, which surely are not the
hallmark of satellite status, there is fairly widespread throughout the new
African countries a declared commitment to socialistic development and great
admiration for the technological and economic achievements of the Soviet
Union over the past forty-five years. The tragic myopia of the Cold War
seems to obscure the fact, however, that these attractions are not basically
political in the sense of forming loyalties to one of the major power blocs but
rest firmly on moral, humane grounds.
The most powerful force in Africa today is the determination to bring
political domination to an end. The resistance to those more subtle forms of
economic and cultural control that are usually described by the Eastern bloc
term "neo-colonialism" is equally strong. The leaders of the new African
countries are not willing to accept a new satellite status from either of the great
power blocs. In the simplistic scheme of some Western politicians and news-
papers, the perceived alternatives for Africa are apparently only two: if
the new African nations are not willing to become Western satellites, then they
must belong to the East. This naive view doubtless finds support in the
sharp criticisms of the West that African leaders frequently make and spokes-
men for the Eastern bloc readily echo. What is the guiding ideology in Africa
and what does it portend?
In my judgment the apparent appeal of Eastern models, frequently couched
in terms of "African socialism," is moral and humane. It is the vision of rapid
development of resources for the benefit of all members of the -community and
freedom from exploitation by any privileged class whether it be economic or
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racial. When the Soviet Union has misread the nature of its appeal to Africa
and has sought its own national aggrandizement, it has encountered effective
resistance. The West too has a moral appeal to Africa, but unfortunately it
is too frequently muted and obscured. The Africans are keenly aware of the
hiatus between our avowed moral code and our conduct, and their sharpest
criticisms are reserved for our moral delinquencies-for Little Rock and Bir-
mingham-for providing economic and military support for Portuguese op-
pression in Angola and Mozambique, and for refusing to support effective sanc-
tions against the inhuman Verwoerd regime in South Africa. If African reac-
tions to such events seem disproportionate to the moral indignation they show
over internal Soviet oppression or such ruthless Soviet interventions as that in
Hungary, the explanation is not difficult to find. They are familiar with
Western colonial exploitation; they see within their own restricted world the
continuing oppression of African people in the Portuguese colonies, South
Africa, and Rhodesia; and they feel vicariously the indignities and depriva-
tions ofLthe millions of black Americans. That their indignation lacks a fully
mature world view is hardly a defence for the moral failures of the western
democracies.
In one fundamentally important respect the humanism of African Socialism
differs from the pure Marxist model. It does not see man in a single dimen-
sion-to the African, man is both material and spiritual. Perception of the
latter aspect arises from strong indigenous attitudes as well as the imported
faiths of Islam and Christianity. This dual view of man is well illustrated in
Dr. Nkrumah's self-description as a "Marxist Socialist and a non-denomina-
tional Christian." The demand in Africa for economic development and
material well-being is thus moderated by certain drives of the human spirit
and personality that offer hope of avoiding the denials of individual human
value that characterized the socialistic revolutions in the Eastern bloc countries.
A second hopeful factor is a commitment to the principle of legality. Such
a commitment is clearly perceptible in Ghana, whose experience will be used
to illustrate the point. Somewhat similar evidence can, I believe, be found
elsewhere. The Akan tradition in Ghana did not vest autocratic power in
officials. On his enstoolment a chief was carefully reminded of his obligations,
both affirmative and negative, to his subjects. Major policy was developed on
a councilliar basis, through protracted discussions intended to produce una-
nimity.' Law-making functions were usually performed in such a way as to
de-emphasize the fiat of the rulers-as in the common law tradition, even
clearly legislative innovation was often articulated as the time-honored custom
of the community. The ruler who arrogantly disregarded these limitations on
his power imposed by indigenous law and custom faced the ultimate sanction
of destoolment.
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In its post-independence experience, Ghana has preserved the insistence on
legality. Each step in the evolution of the formal structures of government and
in the allocation of public power has been taken with a punctilious regard for
the legal niceties. An excellent illustration of this insistence can be found in
the procedures utilized to convert Ghana into a Republic in 1960. At that
time it seemed reasonably clear that a new constitution could havebeen pro-
vided by a simple act of the pre-Republic Parliament. A number of rather
hyper-technical legal doubts about this procedure, plus some obvious political
advantages of a more dramatic technique, led however to a national plebiscite
authorizing a Constituent Assembly to enact a Republican Constitution along
lines explained to the people in advance. The emerging legal order of Ghana
has vested strong powers in government, and legislation has frequently ap-
proved wide areas of discretion for the executive. The policy has been con-
sistently followed, however, of articulating in a duly enacted law the powers
to be exercised and the range of discretion enjoyed.
The principle of legality, standing alone, provides no necessary substantive
restraints on government. As much of the Nazi experience and more recent
events in the' East reveal, extreme denials of fundamental claims to human
dignity can be perpetrated while the principle of legality remains7 intact. -The
fact that it does not offer ultimate protection should not however obscure its
advantages. As I have observed elsewhere,
To be sure, the requirement that governmental interference be supported by law imposes
in itself no susbtantive restraints on government, nor does it determine how power and
function will be allocated among the facilities of government. It is, nevertheless, of pro-
found significance for two reasons: first, it provides a basis on which the action of one
agency can be reviewed and checked, and second, it opens up to popular inspection, and
political response many of the most critical decisions affecting the incidence of public
force.1
As the number of educated, politically sensitive Africans increases, this adher-
ence to the principle of legality could have profoundly significant effects.
A third important force in African development is internationalism. De-
spite the African insistence 'on the end of all external domination and occa-
sional outbursts of national or ethnic provincialism, there is no discernible
tendency to barricade Africa from the rest of the world. African leaders want
to play a role in the broadest international community; they want international
help in accelerating development; and they are keenly aware of the image
they project to the rest of the world. The African nations in general have
been strong supporters of the United Nations and are most inclined to stress
the moral commitments implicit in United Nations membership. I have rarely
detected among Africans, official or private, an unwillingness to discuss their
'Harvey, The Challenge of the Rule of Law, 59 MICH. L. REv. 603, 610 (1961).
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policies, to attempt to defend them, and to accept criticism, so long as they are
treated as equals and criticism is supported by good will. While these attitudes
persist, there is strong hope that law and government will develop in Africa
to levels of decency at least as high as those possessed by the rest of the world.
Finally, the very success of the African revolution argues for its long term
moderation. Development of better balanced economies, improved health
facilities, and wider educational opportunities inevitably will support the de-
mand for humane government under which men can enjoy their progress and
work out their destinies in freedom and security. I would not hazard predic-
tion on the details of structure and method. One is surely entitled to hope that
the African horizon will not be limited by experience elsewhere, and that in
their own way and out of their own traditions Africans will be able to evolve
novel and useful devices for handling the complex, perennial problems of law
and government.
We must not underestimate the magnitude of the tasks facing the young
leaders of Africa, nor can we discount the probability that the coming years
will bring curtailments of individual freedoms and consolidations of autocratic
power that would be totally unacceptable in the stable western democracies.
Where the possibility of strong government exists, power will be exercised in
proportion to the threats perceived to supreme interests. Molding the diverse
elements inherited from colonialism into functional nation-states, breaking
down the barriers between these states to form viable larger entities, bringing
the economies of the new nations to the critical take-off point, and moving on
all these. fronts with sufficient speed to accommodate the awakened expecta-
tions of a continent require strong leaders and governmental interventions in
virtually all aspects of life. From the rest of the world Africa needs support
and encouragement, not carping criticism. Here are great challenges to the
conscience and capacities of the entire world community.
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